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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ADoLPH CooRs CoMPA~Y, a cor-
poration, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LIQUOR CoNTROL CoMMISSION OF 
UTAH, J. w. FUNK, HERBERT c. 
TAYLOR AND HENRY JORGENSEN 
AS COMMISSIONERS 0 F T H E 
LIQUOR CoNTROL CoMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF u TAR' 
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No. 6245 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
STATE!1ENT OF THE CASE. 
This matter is presented upon the allegations in 
the Complaint and Application for Writ of Prohibition 
as put in issue by the Demurrer of the Defendants. 
The Defendant, Utah Liquor Control Commission, 
adopted regulation number 20 on April 7, 1939, regulat-
ing 0ontainers in which light beer may be sold. Plain-
tiff is desirous of offering eight ounce bottles of beer 
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for sale in Utah, which size is not allowed by regulation 
number 20. 
If defendants fail to squarely meet the arguments 
of plaintiff it is by reason of our agreement to file 
simultaneous briefs. Oounsel for plaintiff has, however, 
advised us that his points are as follows: 
1. That the defendant is without authority and 
proceeded beyond and in excess of its jurisdiction in 
adopting sub-section (b) of regulation number 20, and 
2. That if this Court should find the defendant had 
such power that by adopting sub-section (b) of regula-
tion number 20, such action of the Commission was 
arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory. 
ARGUMENT. 
The part of regulation number 20 objected to is in 
the following language : 
(b) ~ o brewer, dealer or wholesaler shall 
adopt or use in the State of Utah any container 
for beer differing in size from the following: 
11 oz. of beer 
12 oz. ·of beer 
22 oz. of beer 
24 oz. of beer 
32 oz. of beer 
64 oz. of beer 
Whole barrels 
Half barrels 
Quarter barrels 
Eighth barrels 
This matter being presented upon the Alternative \~·rit 
of Prohibition does not give the Court the benefit of the 
factual background that motivated and justified the 
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Commission in enacting this regulation. If illusions are 
made to the factual backgTound the absence of a record 
will have to excuse the references. 
Among other things, the Commission, by Section 7 
of Article 3 of Chapter 43, Laws of Utah, 1935, is em-
powered as follows: 
The commission may, fron1 time to time, make 
such resolutions, ~orders and regulations, not in-
consistent with this act, as it may deem necessary 
for carrying out the provisions thereof and for 
its efficient administration. The commission shall 
cause such regulations to be filed in the office 
of the secretary of state, and thereupon they shall 
have the same force as if they formed a part of 
this act. The commission may amend or repeal 
such regulations, and such amendn1ents or repeals 
shall be filed in the sa1ne manner and with like 
effect. The con1mission may from tin1e to tin1e 
cause such regulations to be printed for distribu-
tion in such manner as it may deen1 proper. 
There apparently is no question but "'hat sub-section 
(b) of regulation number 20 is adopted pursuant to the 
procedure outlined in this section. Analysis of Section 
7 indicates that "the commission may * * * make 
* • * regulations, not inconsistent with this act, as 
it may deem necessary for carrying out the provisions 
thereof and for its efficient administration.'' We will 
assume by reason of the issuance of the Alternative Writ 
in this matter that for the purpose of this proceeding the 
Court will deem sub-section (b) of regulation number 
20 to be necessary for the carrying out of the provisions 
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of the Utah Liquor Control Act and f.or its efficient 
administration. 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST POINT. 
THE DEF'ENDANT, UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION, HAS 
AUTHORITY TO REGULATE. CONTAINER SIZES OF LIGHT 
BEER IN UTAH AND IN DOING SO ACTED WITHIN ITS 
JURISDICTION. 
Plaintiff's first point does not raise any constitu-
tional question. It does not question the power of the 
defendants to enact regulations. Plaintiff apparently 
takes the position that although the Legislature has 
delegated to the defendants the power to make certain 
rules and regulations, that this power does not en-
compass the power and authority to make a regulation 
such as sub-section (b) ,of regulation number 20. To 
phrase it another way, that the delegation of authority 
to the defendants is not broad enough to encompass 
the regulation of container sizes for light beer. This, 
of necessity, leads us to a discussion of the rule making 
power. One of the classical discussions on this subject 
is in Mr. Justice Cardozo '·s dissenting opinion in the 
case. of 
Pananta Refining Company vs. Ryan, 
293 U. S. 388, 79 L. Ed. 466. 
''All that Congress could safely do was to 
declare the act to be done and policies to be pro-
moted, leaving to the delegate of its power the 
ascertainment of the shifting facts that would 
determine the relation between the doing of the 
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aet and the attainn1ent of the stated ends. That 
is what it did. It said to the President in sub-
stance: You are to consider whether the trans-
portation ,of oil in excess of the statutory quotas 
is offensiYe to one or more of the policies enulner-
ated in Sec. 1, whether the effect of such conduct 
is to promote unfair con1petition or to waste the 
natural resources or to demoralize prices or to 
increase unemployment or to reduce the purchas-
ing po·wer of the workers of the nation. If these 
standards or smne of them have been flouted with 
the result of a substantial obstruction to indus-
trial recoYery you 1nay then by a prohibitory 
order eradicate the mischief. * * * 
"'In what has been written, I have stated, but 
without developing the argument, that by rea-
sonable implication the power conferred upon the 
President by Section 9 (c) is to be read as if 
coupled with the words that he shall exercise 
the power whenever satisfied that by doing so he 
will effectuate the policy of the statute as there-
tofore declared. Two cannons of interpretation, 
each familiar to our law, leave no eseape from 
that conclusion. One is that the meaning of a 
statute is to be looked for, not in any single 
section, but in all the parts together and in their 
relation to the end in view. Cherokee Intermar-
riage Cases, 203 U. S. 76, 89, 51 L. Ed. 96, 102, 
27 S. Ct. 29; McKee vs. United States, 164 U. S. 
287, 41 L. Ed. 437, 17 S. Ct. 92; Talbott v. Silver 
Bow Oounty, 139 U. S. 438, 443, 444, 35 L. Ed. 
210, 211, 213, 11 S. Ct. 594. The other is that 
when a statute is reasonably susceptible of two 
interpretations by one of which it is unconstitu-
tional and by the other valid, the court prefers 
the meaning that preserves to the meaning that 
destroys. United States ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. 
Deleware & H. Co., 23 U. S. 366, 407, 53 L. Ed. 
836, 848, 29 S. Ct. 527; Knights Templars' & ~L 
Life Indem. Co. vs. Jarman, 187 U. S. 197, 205, 
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47 L. Ed. 139, 145, 23 S. Ct. 108. Plainly, See. 1, 
with its declaration ·of the will of Congress, is the 
chart that has been furnished to the President 
to enable him to shape this course among the 
reefs and shallows of his act. If there could be 
doubt as to this when Sec. 1 is viewed alone, the 
doubt would be dispelled by the reiteration of the 
policy in the sections that come later. In Sec. :2, 
which relates to administration agencies, in See. 
3, which relates to Codes of Fair Competition, in 
Sec. 4, which relates to agreements and licenses, 
in Sec. 6, which prescribes limitations upon the 
application of the statute, and in .Sec. 10 which 
permits the adoption of rules and regulations, 
authority is conferred upon the President to do 
. one or more acts as the delegate of Congress when 
he is satisfied that thereby he will aid 'in effectu-
ating the policy of this title' or in carrying out its 
provisions. True Sec. 9, the one relating to 
petroleum, does not by express words ·of reference 
embody the same standard, yet nothing different 
can have been meant. What, indeed, is the alter-
native? Either the ·statute means that the Presi-
dent is to adhere to the declared policy of Con-
gress, or it means that he is to exercise a merely 
arbitrary will. The one construction invigorates 
the act; the ·other saps its life. A choice between 
is hard. 
''I am persuaded that a reference, express or 
implied, to the policy of Congress as declared 
in Sec. 1 is a sufficient definition of a standard 
to make the statute valid. Discretion is not 
unconfined and vagrant. It is canalized within 
banks that keep it from flowing. Marshall Field 
& Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 39 L. Ed. 294, 12 
S. Ct. 495; United States v. Crimaud, 220 U. S. 
506, L. Ed. 563; 31 S. Ct. 480; and J. vY. Hampton, 
Jr., and Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 72 
L. Ed. 624, 48 S. Ct. 348, state the applicable 
principle. Under these decisions the separation 
of powers between the Executive and Congress 
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7 
is not a doctrinaire concept to be umde use of 
with pedantic rigor. There must be sensible ap-
proximation, there must be elasticity of adjust-
ment, in response to the practical necessities of 
government, which cannot forsee today the devel-
opments of tomorrow in their nearly infinite 
variety. 
In United States v. Grin1aud, (1911) 220 U. S. 
506, 33 L. Ed. 563, 31 S. Ct. 480, the court stated: 
'' Fron1 the beginning of the government various 
acts have been passed conferring upon executive 
officers power to make rules and regulations-
not for the government of their department, but 
for the administering of the laws which did gov-
ern. None of the~e statutes could confer legisla-
tive power. But when Congress had legislated 
and indicated its will, it could give to those who 
were to act under such general provisions 'power 
to fill up the details' by the establishment of 
administrative rules and regulations, the violation 
of which could be punished by fine or imprison-
ment fixed by Congress, or by penalties fixed 
by Congress or measured by the injury done.'' 
Adopting the language of Justice Cardozo, the prob-
lem raised by Plaintiff's first point is, where are the 
banks that confine the rule making power of the Gom-
missi,on? Thi·s court has already upheld the regulations 
of the Commission relative to the advertising of beer 
upon billboards in the case of 
Bird and J ex Company, et al., v. J. W. Funk, 
et al., 85 P. (2d) 834 
where the court announced the rule in the following 
language: 
Where the legislature delegates to an adminis-
trative agency po\ver to make rules and regula-
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tions, such delegation must be accompanied by a 
declared policy outlining the field within which 
such rules and regulations may be adopted. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U. S., 295 U. S. 495, 
55 S. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed. 1570, 97 A. L. R. 947; 
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55 
S. Ct. 241, 79 L. Ed. 446; State v. Goss, 79 Utah 
559, 11 P. (2d) 340. From this it must necessarily 
follow that all rules and regulations adopted by 
an administrative board or agency must be in 
furtherance of and follow out the declared poli-
cies of the legislative enactment. If the regula-
tions or rules are in excess ,of the declared pur-
poses of the statute, they are invalid. State v. 
Goss, supra; Utah Mfrs. Ass 'n v. Stewart, 82 
Utah 198, 23 P. (2d) 229. 
A further instructive statement from this court on the 
same subject is taken from the recent case of 
Rowell v. State Board of AgricultrLtre, 
99 P. (2d) 3 
(1) That the legislature may not surrender 
or delegate its legislative power is elemental. 
It may, however, provide for the execution 
through administrative agencies of its legislative 
policy, and may confer upon such administrative 
officers certain powers and the duty of determ-
ining the question of the existence of certain 
facts upon which the effect or execution of its 
legislative policy 1nay be dependent. l\IcOrew v. 
Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 203, 85 P. (2d) 
608; Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 58 
S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 L. Ed. 1129. Said the New 
York Court in Elite Dairy P~oducts v. Ten Eyck, 
271 N. Y. 488, 3 N. E. (2d) 606, 609: "The Leg-
islature may properly authorize an administra-
tive officer to * * * determine questions of 
fact. Any discretion there left to the admnistra-
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tive officer is -confined to a desig·nated field, and 
within that field rests, not upon unfettered choice, 
but upon the applicati·on of rules or reason to 
facts proven or found.'' In Thompson v. Smith, 
133 Ya. ~1G7, 13-! S. E. 379, 584, 71 A. L. R. 604, 
the court said: "It is a fundamental principle 
of our system of government that the rights of 
men are to be deternrined by the law itself, and 
not bv the let or leave of adrninistrative officers 
or bu.reaus. This principle ought not to be sur-
rendered f>Or {'Onvenience or in effed nullified for 
the sake of expediency. It is the prerogative and 
function of the legislative branch of the go,Tern-
n1ent, whether state or municipal, to determine 
and declare what the law shall be, and the legis-
lative branch of the govern1nent may not divest 
itself of this function ·or delegate it to executive 
or administrative officers.'' The court further 
said: "The majority of the cases lay down the 
rule that statutes or ordinances vesting discretion 
in administrative officers and bureaus must lay 
down rules and tests to guide and control then1 
in the exercise of the discreti•on granted in order 
to be valid * * *." And in .Mutual Film Corp. 
v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U. S. 230, 
239, 35 S. Ct. 387, 392, 59 L. Ed. 552, Ann. Cas. 
1916C, 296, it is said: ''The legislature must 
declare the policy of the law and fix the legal 
principles which are to control in given cases; 
but an administrative body may be invested with 
the power to ascertain the facts and conditions 
to which the policy and principles apply.'' 
Applying this to the problem at hand we must revert 
to Section 7, where the defendants are empowered to 
make "regulations not inconsistent with this act, as may 
be deemed necessary for carrying out the provisions 
thereof and for its efficient adnrinistration." Two banks 
are established by this Secti•on, the first is, that the 
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regulations must not be inconsistent with the act, and 
second, that it must be deemed necessary to carry out 
the provisions of the act and for its efficient administra-
tion. Section 8 in sub-section ( s) empowers the Com-
mission to make "all needful 'regulations for the carry-
ing out of the provisions of this act.'' Plaintiff probably 
inquires, but where is there anything within this language 
to indicate that the Legislature intended that the Com-
mission should regulate light beer containers 1 Section 
96, among other things, makes it unlawful ''for any per-
son to manufacture, sell ~or otherwise dispose of any 
bottled beer in containers of a capacity of more than 
64 fluid ounces.'' Here is another bank or levy re-
straining and limiting this rule making power in that we 
now find that the power to regulate is from 1 to 64 fluid 
ounces and not more, and that the regulation must not 
be inconsistent with the act and deemed necessary for 
the carrying out of the provisions thereof. Another 
section which must be included within this discussion is 
Section 2, outlining the purposes the Legislature sought 
to serve by the enactment of the Liquor Control Act. 
This section reads : 
This act shall be deemed an exercise of the police 
powers of the state for the protectiron of the 
public health, peace and morals; to prevent the 
recurrence of abuses associated with saloons; to 
eliminate the evils of unlicensed and unlawful 
manufacture, selling and disposing of alcoholic 
beverages; and all provisions of this act shall be 
liberally construed for the attainment of these 
purposes. 
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In other words, the defendants in the performance 
of their duties under the Liquor Act enacted sub-section 
(b) of regulati•on nuinber 20, on the theory that by so 
doing they were protecting the public health, peace and 
morals of the citizens and for the purpose of preventing 
the recurrence of abuses associated with saloons and to 
eliminate the evils of unlicensed and unlawful manu-
facture and selling of alcoholic beverages •on the theory 
that the regulation was one deemed necessary for the 
earrying out of the provisions of the Act. 
Xow the regulation in question is not attacked on 
the ground that there are t•oo many sizes, or that the 
size of containers allowed by sub-section (b) are not 
actually needed and used in the manufacturing and dis-
tributing ·of light beer within the State of Utah, but 
rather, the regulation is attacked on the ground that there 
is no such power to regulate container sizes within the 
Commission. In ·other words, Plaintiff's position is that 
a licensed brewer, distributor or retailer should he al-
lowed to sell beer in any size container, from 1 to 64 fluid 
ounces, including all fractions or any number included 
therein. In other words, if Plaintiff is entitled to sell an 
8 ounce bottle the same argument that sustains his 
position and contention, would sustain his position and 
desire to sell a 6 ounce, 4 ounce or a 34 ounce bottle. 
This court, in the Bird and J ex case, supra, found 
that the provis•o in Section 140 ''that advertising of light 
beer shall be permitted under such regulations as the 
Commission may make'' became an exception to the 
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general prohibition against the advertising of alcoholic 
beverages contained in Section 140. The last sentence 
of Section 96 prohibits the sale of bottled beer in con-
tainers of more than 64 fluid ounces, being a prohibition 
against sale of bottled beer in larger containers by leav-
ing the regulation of sizes less than 64 fluid ounces to the 
general regulatory p•owers of the Commission granted by 
Sections 7 and 8. 
An examination at this time as to the reason which 
prompted the Legislature to leave certain ·subjects to the 
regulation of its Commission might be worth exploring. 
It seems obvious that the only reaHon for any legis-
lative body to leave to a commission, bureau or execu-
tive the making of any regulations would be that the· 
Legislature in endeavoring to accomplish its ends was 
uncertain as to the applicable regulation to accomplish 
its stated end, and so for the purpose of accomplishing 
its end, first set forth the purpose to be accomplished 
and then established the means by which the end should 
be accomplished and then left to the commission, bureau 
or executive the power of adopting the particular means 
to the shifting facts for the purpose of accomplishing 
the stated end. 
An examination of the statute as it applies to the 
taxation of bottled beer clearly illustrates and demon-
strates the problem presented to the Legislature. Sec-
tion 83 of Article 5, ·of Chapter 43, Laws of Utah, 1935, 
provides as follows: 
Beer may be manufactured, sold, delivered, dis-
tributed, bottled, shipped or transported or re-
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moved for storage or eonsu1nption or sale within 
this state, or possessed or consumed therein or 
imported into or exported therefrom in the man-
ner and under the conditions prescribed in this 
act, or in the regulations, and not otherwise. 
It will be noted that this section contemplates the 
Commissi·on regulating the manufacturing, selling, de-
livering, distributing, bottling, shipping, transporting, 
possessing and consun1ption of beer within the State of 
Utah. \Yhile Section 96 provides that 
It shall be unlawful for any person to import, re-
ceive, possess, dispense, sell, give, offer for sale, 
deliver, distribute, ship, transport or store or in 
any manner use, either in the original package 
or otherwise, any beer unless the excise tax im-
posed by this act shall have been paid and unless 
a stamp or label showing such tax to have been 
paid shall be affixed to the barrel, bottle, or other 
immediate container of the beer; provided, that 
the commission may by regulation provide the 
conditions under which brewers licensed under 
this act may possess beer before the tax shall be 
paid thereon and the conditions under which they 
may export beer from the state without the pay-
ment of the tax. It shall be unlawful for any 
person to keep, sell, or otherwise dispose of any 
bottled beer in containers of a capacity of more 
than sixty-four fluid ounce·s, and shall be s-o·ld only · 
in the original containers. 
The Legislature, by this section, clearly contemplated 
that the manufacture, sale and distribution of beer, 
from the time of its manufacture to its sale to the con-
suming publie, should be regulated by statute or by regu-
lation. Now as to the method of collecting the tax, we 
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find in Section 102 of Article 5, of Chapter 43, Laws of 
Utah, 1935: 
The state auditor is hereby directed to have pre-
pared, according to such specifications and designs 
and in such denominations as may be submitted to 
him by the state tax commission, stamps for use 
on packages and containers .of beer subject to tax 
under the provisions of this act. Upon requisi-
tions from the state tax commission the state 
auditor shall deliver to its order the stamps des-
ignated in such requisition and shall keep an 
accurate record of all stamps coming into and 
leaving his hands. The cost ·of such stamps shall 
be charged to the general fund of the state. 
And in Section 103 of Article 5, ,of Chapter 43, Laws of 
Utah, 1935: 
The state tax commission shall at all times obtain 
and keep on hand or available stamps of denom-
inations suitable for paying the tax on containers 
of beer ordinarily in use at the time, including 
bottles, jugs and cans, of a maximum c.apacity 
of 16 ounces; bottles of a maximun1 capacity of 
32 ounces; bottles of a maximum capacity of 64 
ounces; kegs ·of a maximum capacity of one-eighth 
barrel; kegs of a maximum capacity of one-
quarter barrel; and barrels of maximum capacity 
of 31 wine gallons. The state tax commission 
may, in its discretion, cause to be prepared and 
kept on hand stamps of other denominations. The 
stamp affixed to any immediate c-ontainer under 
the provisions of the act must be sufficient to pay 
the tax upon the maximum capacity of such con-
tainer, and if stamps are not provided by law or 
in the discretion of the state tax commission of 
denominati·ons accurately adapted for the pay-
ment of the tax on the container of the next 
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higher capacity. ~nvh stmups shall only be sold 
bY the state tax conllllission to those who have 
satisfied said commission under such regulations 
as it may prescribe that they are authorized to 
use the stamp. The state tax corn1nission 1nay, in 
its discretion, establish reasonable tolerance with 
relation to the maxinn1m capacity of containers 
and the tax to be paid with respect thereto. 
Section 95 in1poses an excise tax of eighty cents per bar-
rel of thirty-one gallons. 
It imn1ediately becon1es apparent that if there is 
no regulati·on governing container sizes that under the 
act beer may be sold in containers from less than one 
ounce up to sixty-four ounces, and as a part of the duties 
of the Utah Liquor Control Commission and the Utah 
State Tax Commissi·on that stamps must be prepared 
for all sizes of containers that the distributors may 
desire. 
It further becomes apparent from the tenure of all 
the sections of the act that the legislature intended that 
beer should be manufactured, sold and delivered under 
strict supervision and control. It must be borne in mind 
that at the time this act became effective that the Legis-
lature of this State had not enjoyed any practical exper-
ience with the regulation of beer for some twenty years. 
Realizing this the legislature clearly indicated the end 
to be accomplished and to the best of its ability the 
means to be used to accomplish the end and then em-
powered its commission to complete the pattern by regu-
lati-on. 
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It is respectfully submitted that the regulatory 
power of the Commission encompasses the power to 
regulate container sizes for light beer. 
SECOND POINT. 
SUB-SECTION (B) OF REGULATION NUMBER 20 IS NOT ARBI-
TRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR DISCRIMINATORY. 
This point pre-supposes a review of the action of 
the Commission in enacting the questioned regulation. 
In other words, plaintiff says that in view of all the facts, 
in view of all the ·customs of the trade, that the Com-
mission, in adopting container sizes specified in sub-
section (h), supra, acted arbitrarily, capriciously and 
dis crimina torily. 
It is respectfully submitted that this question cannot 
be acted upon by this Court without having before it the 
same facts that were before the defendant Commission 
when it adopted the regulation. In other words, there 
is nothing before this Court at this time to indicate to 
this Court what the practice is relative to the sale of 
light beer. There is nothing before this Oourt to advise 
it of the cost to the brewer, to the wholesaler and to the 
distributor of infinite ·container sizes. There is nothing 
before this Court to indicate the commercial abuses 
which arise through uncontrolled container sizes. 
One of the keen desires of the Legislature as ex-
pressed by their Section 2 of the Liquor Act, was to 
prohibit a return of the abuses of the old saloon. What 
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are the abuses connected with the old .saloon and in what 
way did those abuses revolYe about the sale of beer~ 
"?hat was the so-called "tied house" and what was the 
vice connected with the so-called "tied house'' and why 
was it that the brewer became the owner of the dis-
pensaries wherein their product was sold 1 And what is 
the relation between beer sold through grocery stores 
and that sold for consu1nption on the premises and how 
do container sizes affect the so-called "drive-in'' trade 
and what is the competition in varying container sizes 
and what is the difference between an eight and eleven 
ounce bottle in actual appearance, and will eight ounce 
bottles be pawned off as eleven ounce bottles, and what 
is the relation between bottled beer and draught beer? 
These, and a multitude of other questions, are pertinent 
as to whether or not the regulation in question is arbi-
trary, capricious or discriminatory. 
It is respectfully submitted that any regulation has 
within its being certain elements of discrimination and 
arbitrariness. But the question is whether or not it is 
so arbitrary as to affect and violate the rights of the 
questioning party. Until plaintiff's argument as to the 
discrimination that is being practiced against his client 
is made more clear and definite and until the way in 
which defendants were capricious in enacting sub-section 
(b), supra, is at least outlined and their arbitrariness 
is made more explicit, defendants prefer to rest this 
part of the plaintiff's argument on the sole basis, that 
until a record is before this Court nothing that can be 
done or said in briefs or by counsel that can properly 
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advise this Court that it may adequately review the 
action of defendants in establishing this regulation. 
To pass upon this regulation in the manner in which it 
is now before this Court would be to ask this Court to 
reflect its judgment on container sizes for light beer 
without any exposition of the problem, which is factual. 
The ·only factual matter defendants offer to this Court 
is that regulation number 20, sub-.section (·b), encom-
passed all bottle sizes in use in Utah at the time of its 
adoption. 
Respectfully submitted, .. 
D. HowE MoFFAT, 
GEORGE H. LUNT' 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
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